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ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the evolutionary process of the bank as an
asset transformer. First, the bank must have a cost advantage in
acquiring information about the assets to be invested. If investors
do not trust information produced by the bank, it would be in the best
interest of the bank to engage in asset transformation, though pro-
bably a second best choice due to a credibility constraint. If the
bank is less risk averse than investors, asset transformation could be
a first best choice of the bank and the most efficient form of banking
in terms of social welfare.

INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to model the evolutionary process
of financial intermediaries (hereafter, banks) as asset transformers.
WHY do banks exist? This existence question has long been a vital
issue to the understanding of the objectives and activities of banks
in capital markets. An analysis of the existence of banks provides
an economic justification for the specific form of various activities
conducted by banks. One important banking activity is asset transfor-
mation, the process of issuing liabilities and then using the proceeds
to invest in other assets.
In order to explain the role of banks as asset transformers,
researchers have focused upon the ability (or motivation) of banks to
(i) hold diversified portfolios and (ii) produce information about
assets held. Klein (1973) and Benston and Smith (1976), among others,
suggest that depositors, on their own, hold suboptimal portfolios
because of large denomination constraints (Klein) or substantial tran-
saction cost constraints (Benston and Smith), and, therefore, banks
evolve to exploit these constraints.
Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that the role of banks would be to
resolve problems associated with information asymmetry between bor-
rowers and lenders. Chan (1983) shows that if the capital market
collapses to the "lemons" market due to information asymmetry between
managers and investors, banks could evolve as informed agents, con-
tributing to resource allocation and social welfare.
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A critique of Leland and Pyle is provided by Campbell and Kracaw
(1980). If the market is not allowed to scrutinize assets held by
banks, because investors can mimic the investment decisions of honest
banks, it would be in the best interest of banks with low quality
assets to produce false information. Diamond (1984) shows that port-
folio diversification is a mechanism to reduce the agency problem of
2
banks.
The current study is improved upon the earlier works, and can be
contrasted with in at least three different ways. First, we view
asset transformation as a simple process of issuing risk-free debts
(deposits) and investing the proceeds in a single class of risky
assets; portfolio diversification itself is not required in the pro-
cess of asset transformation.
Second, in order to address the moral hazard problem of banks, we
explicitly distinguish between the broker bank and the asset trans-
forming bank. The former sells information only; and the latter, uti-
lizing its information, engages in the asset transformation. Because
investors can observe the assets held by asset tranforming banks in
our model (i.e., a single type of risky assets), the distinction
between these two different banking modes allows us to create a
situation in which it would be in the best interest of banks to invest
in "high quality" risky assets.
Third, our capital market avoids the lemons market even though
investors (lenders) cannot observe managers' (borrowers') investment
decisions. As will be shown later, the capital market under such
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information asymmetry can establish a mixture of the conventional com-
petitive equilibrium and the Akerlof (1970)-type lemons market
equilibrium. We shall call such an equilibrium the mixed quality
equilibrium; and introduce banks after the mixed quality equilibrium
is established.
In brief, our main results, which reinforce those of earlier
studies, are as follows. First, the bank must have a cost advantage
in acquiring information about the assets to be invested. Second,
when investors do not trust information produced by the bank, it would
be in the best interest of the bank to engage in asset transformation,
probably as a second best choice due to a credibility constraint.
Third, when the bank is less risk averse than investors, asset trans-
formation can be a first best choice of the bank and the most effi-
cient form of banking in terms of social welfare.
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows: In Section I,
we present a two-period rational expectations equilibrium model for
the capital market without banks. We will show how the capital market
establishes the mixed quality equilibrium. In Section II, we discuss
the role of banks as information producers and asset transformers. We
provide a summary of the paper in the last section.
I. CAPITAL MARKET WITHOUT BANKS
A. Assumptions
There are two periods; the beginning of the first period is
denoted by t =0, the end of the first period by t = 1, and the end of
the second period by t 2. There are potentially many risk adverse
3
investors and N (a fixed number) risk neutral managers. At t = 0,
-4-
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each manager develops one unit of an investment project. There are
two types of projects, H-type and L-type, differentiated by initial
development (sunk) costs spent by managers, C and C , where C > C .
H L H L
H-type project will be shown to be of a higher quality than L-type.
Investors cannot observe managers' development costs (i.e., project
quality).
At the end of each period, the investment project yields a random
return R which takes on one of two values, R„ and IL , where R^ > R .
The realized return is public information so that there is no ex post
informational asymmetry about the realized return between managers and
investors. The probability distribution of R, conditional on the
initial development cost, is
y for i j
Pr(R |C.) = { (1)
J I7 for i * j
where i, j - H, L and 1/2 <yXl. The probability distribution
itself is common knowledge.
Even though investors cannot observe project quality at t 0,
they can, using the probabilistic relation (1), infer it to some
degree by observing the realized return at t 1. By Blackwell's suf-
ficiency theorem, the random return R becomes more informative as y
increases. If y 1/2, R does not carry any useful information; if
y » 1, R is perfectly informative; and if 1/2 < y < 1, R is partially
informative.
Given the probabilistic relation in equation (1), the conditional
means and variances of R are
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E(R|C
R
) = yR
R
+ (1-y)^ (2-a)
e(r|c
l )
- (l-y)R
H
+ yR
L
(2-b)
a
2 (R|C
R
) - a
2 (R|C
L
) = y(l-y )(RR-RL )
2
= V. (2-c)
Because both projects bear the same amount of risk, we will call the
former the high quality project, and the latter the low quality
project.
In order to focus on the quality choice , we assume that each
investor purchases one unit of the project. It is costly for
investors to locate a manager with a project available. This transac-
tion cost, h, is an increasing function of the market size, N. When
investors enter the capital market at t = 0, investors have a homoge-
neous prior belief that the chance of purchasing the high quality pro-
ject is z (0
_< z < 1). In the self -fullf illing rational expectations
equilibrium, the prior belief z must be equal to the proportion of
high quality projects. We will use z interchangeably for the prior
belief of investors and the equilibrium proportion of high quality
projects since we are concerned only with the equilibrium behavior.
Given the investors' prior belief z, a manager and a matched
investor reach an equilibrium wage contract for managerial services in
the following way. Investors pay W at t for the first period's
managerial service when all projects are indistinguishable to
investors, and W (i H, L) at t 3 1 for the second period's mana-
gerial service paid at t 1 in accordance with the first period's
realized return R . These wages are endogenously determined; and, in
particular, W is not a priori expected to be higher than W .
il Li
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Given this wage contractual arrangement and the probabilistic
relation in equation (1), managers' net present value (NPV) of the
high and low quality projects, NPV and NPV , are
H L
NPV
H
=
-C
R
+ W + p{yW
R
+ (l-y)W
L >
(3a)
NPV
L
=
-C
L
+ W + p{(l-y)W
H
+ yW
L )
(3b)
where < p < 1 is the risk-free discount factor.
Investors' one-period net expected utility (or certainty equiva-
8
lent return) is described as
U(E(R),V,P) = p(E(R) - 9V) - P - h(N) (4)
where E(R) is the expected return, V is the variance of R, 9 > is
the measure of the investors' risk aversion, P is the payment to the
manager, N (the number of managers) is the market size, and h is the
9
transaction cost. Because of competition among potentially many
investors, they are willing to invest as long as they earn the
reservation expected utility, which is assumed to be zero without loss
of generality.
In order to focus on how the lemons market can be avoided in
equilibrium, we assume that < z < 1. Given z (and y), the
probability that an investor receives L at t » 1, v, is
v(z) =• yz + (l-y)(l-z). (5)
Since < z < 1, it follows that < v(z) < 1.
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When observing Che realized return at t 1, investors assess
posterior probabilities about the project quality. Let r(z) be the
probability that the project yields R at t = 2 given that its
realized return at t = 1 is L; and s(z) be the probability that the
project yields R, at t = 2 given that its realized return at t - 1 is
R . Using Bayes ' rule, we have
L
r(z) =-p~r (6-a)
v(z)
_
y(l-z)
s(z) = 7—r . (6-b)
l-v(z)
Both r and s increase, given z, when y increases.
Given that realized returns at t 1 are R^ and R , investors'
conditional expected utilities for the second period are U and U
,
H. L
respectively:
U - p{rE(R|C) + (l-r)E(R|C) - 9V} - Wu (7-a)
rl n L rl
U
L
= p{(l-s)E(R|C
H
) + sE(R|C
L
) - 8V} - W . (7-b)
The expected utility from the ownership of the project over two
periods, U , is
U_ = p{zE(R|C) + (l-z)E(R|C ) - 8V} - W - h(N) + p{vUu+(l-v)U }. (8)r rl L rl L
B. The Mixed Quality Equilibrium
In order for both high quality and low quality projects to exist
in equilibrium, two conditions must be satisfied. First, managers
must be indifferent as to whether they develop the high or low quality
project; NPV = NPV . Using equations (3-a) and (3-b), we have
rl L
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AW = |^f for y > 1/2. (9)2y-l
where AW ( = W - W ) is the wage differencial at t 1, and AC ( = C„ -
C ) is the manager's development cost differential at t (its
future value at t 1 is AC/p). Equation (9) shows the wage differen-
tial, adjusted for imperfect posterior information, required by
managers to undertake the high quality project.
Second, given the equilibrium wage contract, investors anticipate
their conditional expected utilities U and U at t = 1 are the same.
H L
Using equations (7-a) and (7-b), we have
AW - p(r+s-l)AE(R)n (10)
where AE(R) = E(R|C„) - E(R|C ). Equation (10) shows the wage premium
H L
investors are willing to pay for the project that yields R,, based on
their posterior belief about project quality.
Combining equations (9) and (10) determines the mixed quality
equilibrium, equation (11):
p(r+s-l)AE(R)
-$% (ID
where the equilibrium proportion of high quality projects (if it
exists), z, can be solved.
Figure I shows the graphical solutions of z (assuming their
existence) when y < 1. The existence of the mixed quality equilibrium
requires the maximum of the left hand side of equation (11),
2
p(2y-l) (R -R
T
), must not be less than the right hand side;
H L
y • {(1/2) + (l/2)(AC/(p
2
AR)) 1/3 } =y . (> 1/2)
—
l ' mi n
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where AR e L - IL • That is, in order to avoid the lemons market, the
informational content in R should exceed a certain minimum level.
Assuming that y > y . , there are two possible solutions, z and
min A
z . We take z as the equilibrium solution in that z ^ s not sta 5]_ e •
if z < (>) z , the premium investors are willing to pay is greater
B
(less) than the required wage differential (i.e., managers have an
incentive to develop the high (low) quality project), and thus the
proportion of high (low) quality projects will further increase.
We determine the equilibrium wages from the zero expected utility
conditions; that is, U = Uu U T = leads to
p H L
W = p{zE(R|C
H )
+ (l-z)E(R|C
L
) - 9V} - h(N) (12-a)
W
H
= p{rE(R|C
H
) + (l-r)E(R|C
L
) - 9V} (12-b)
W
L
= p{(l-s)E(R|C
H
) + sE(R|C
L
) - 9V}. (12-c)
We assume that these equilibrium wages yield a non-negative NPV to
managers.
II. MODELING BANKS
Given that the capital market is in the mixed quality equilibrium
(0 < z < 1), we now introduce banks at t as perfectly informed
agents In the sense that they are able to locate and identify high
quality project managers. We assume that perfectly informed agents
can purchase the project before uninformed investors (i.e., perfect
information includes the location of high quality managers).
Therefore, the size of the capital market without banks shrinks by the
-10-
nuraber of perfectly informed agents. Since the mixed quality equi-
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librium is not affected by the market size (i.e., 3z/8N « 0), the
presence of perfectly informed investors does not affect the equi-
librium proportion of high quality projects held by uninformed
investors.
A. Value of Perfect Prior Information
Before we discuss the conditions for the evolution of banks, it is
useful to consider a situation where investors have direct access to
perfect prior information at some fixed cost F while _no banks yet
exist. To determine the equilibrium number of perfectly informed in-
vestors, suppose that n investors decide to be perfectly informed in
order to purchase the high quality project (we will see later that
perfectly informed investors do not buy the low quality project), and
N - n remaining managers sell their projects to uninformed investors.
The perfectly informed investor behaves in the Nash way; that is, he
assumes that others do not change their investment strategies. Also,
he does not have to confess the possession of perfect information to
the manager.
The investors' expected utility from the high quality project with
perfect prior information becomes p(l+p){E(R|C )-9V} - W -
p{yW +(l-y)W }. By substituting equilibrium wages in equations
(12-a), (12-b) and (12-c) (note that the transaction cost, h(N), is
replaced by h(N-n) in equation 12-a) into the expected utility from
the high quality project, the gain from perfect prior information,
13
m(n), is computed as
-11-
m(n) = (l-z)(p(l+p)AE(R) - AC } + h(N-n) >
14
(13)
where the first term in the right hand side is the net expected gain
from the high quality project relative to random investment, and the
second term is transaction cost saving.
In Figure II, we draw m(n) and F assuming that m(0) > F. The
equilibrium number of perfectly informed investors, n*, is determined
where m(n*) F. For example, if n < n*, the gain from perfect infor-
mation exceeds the information acquisition cost, so that more inves-
tors purchase perfect information. Assuming that n*
_< N, it is
necessary and sufficient that in order for some investors to be per-
fectly informed, m(0) must be greater than F, or N must be greater
than some critical level that depends on the degree of informational
imperfection and the magnitude of transaction cost. It can be shown
that 9m/3y < 0; the gain from perfect prior information decreases as
the accuracy of posterior information increases. Therefore, 3n*/3y <
0.
The availability of perfect information reduces the transaction
cost to uninformed investors from h(N) to h(N-n*), resulting in an
increase in W (see equation 12-a) and, thus, managers' NPV. Since
investors' expected utility remains the same regardless of whether
they are perfectly informed or uninformed, the availability of perfect
information increases social welfare by increasing managers' NPV.
Finally, investors have no incentive to purchase perfect infor-
mation to invest in the low quality project. The gain from the low
quality project with perfect information can be shown as m(n) -
(p(l+p)AE(R) - AC} which is less than m(n) for all n.
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B. The Monopolistic Bank: Brokerage
Are banks still likely to evolve even when investors can be per-
fectly informed at some cost? We first consider a broker monopolistic
bank that sells perfect prior information at some fee. We assume
that the broker bank is honest for our benchmark analysis.
Suppose that the bank serves n (< N) pairs of investors and mana-
gers so that there remain N - n managers who sell their projects to
uninformed investors. The bank can charge m, as defined in equation
(13), for its brokerage service because at such fee investors are
indifferent as to whether they purchase the project through the bank
or directly from a manager. Therefore, m(n) is the demand price for
the information service provided by the bank. This information fee
must not exceed the information acquisition cost, F.
Assume that the broker bank spends the same amount F to be
perfectly informed (e.g., an irrevocable entry fee into the business
of financial brokerage) and bears the variable cost of handling the
customers, D (a strictly increasing and convex function of the number
D
of clients, n). The broker bank's profit, U , is
B
U (n) = n m(n) - D(n) - F (14)
o o
where the adjustment for risk is not required because the broker bank
does not assume any risk.
In Figure III, we draw the demand (m) , marginal revenue (MR) and
marginal cost (MC) curves. The marginal revenue curve is dis-
continuous at n* which is the equilibrium number of perfectly informed
investors when no banks exist. Unless the broker bank has such a high
-13-
cost condition that the marginal cost curve intersects the horizontal
or discontinuous part of the marginal revenue curve, the optimal
number of the broker bank's customers, n , would be greater than n* at
B
the fee of nL which is less than F.
More specifically, the condition for the existence of the broker
bank (n > n*) can be expressed in terms of exogenous cost functions.
B
Because 3U /3n — for n -r n^,
n > n* if
9U
B
B 3n
> 0.
n=n*
Since m'(n*) = -h'(N-n*) and m(n*) = F, the above inequality condition
yields tu > n* if
F - n*h'(N-n*) > D(n*). (15)
B
The left hand side of inequality (15) is the marginal benefit of
perfect information produced by the broker bank, while the right hand
side is the marginal cost for the introduction of such bank. If
inequality (15) is met, the number of uninformed investors (and, thus,
their transaction costs) will be further reduced compared to the case
where investors purchase perfect information individually. As a
result, social welfare will further increase. In sum, the bank as an
information producer must have a cost advantage in acquiring perfect
information.
The overall proportion of high quality projects (q ) increases in
the presense of the bank. That is,
-14-
n+z(N-n)
_
. ,. N N , . ,.
q = = X(l-z) + z > z (16)
where X = n/N.
The welfare implications of the broker bank are provided by the
following comparative static results on n„ (assuming that inequality
(15) is met):
(i) 3n /3y < 0: As R becomes more informative, the bank's contri-
B
bution to social welfare decreases.
(ii) 3n /3N > 0: As the potential size of the capital market without
B
banks increases, the bank's contribution to social welfare
increases.
(iii) 3n_/3h > (assuming that h is a linear function): As the unit
B
transaction cost to uninformed investors increases, the number
of the bank's customers increases. This result might parallel
the suggestion of Benston and Smith (1977) that the role of
banks is to minimize the transaction cost.
C. The Monopolistic Bank: Asset Transformation
We now turn to a monopolistic asset transforming bank that issues
18
risk-free bonds and invests the proceeds in high quality projects.
As was discussed before, an agent with perfect information has no
incentive to invest in the low quality project. Hence, we do not need
to consider dishonesty of banks when the bank performs the asset
transformation function.
Investors buy either the risk-free bond from the bank or the risky
investment project from a manager. The risk-free bond is sold for
-15-
P at t and pays Rf at the end of each period such that P
=
p(l+p)R • For clear exposition, we assume that the bank issues one
share of the bond against one unit of the high quality investment pro-
ject; the bank, matches the number of bonds (i.e., customers) with that
of risky assets.
The present value of risk adjusted profit of the bank when
engaging in asset transformation, U , is
U
]
.(n) = n{p(l+p)[E(R|C
H
) - ^V] - W - p[yW
H
+ (l-y)Wj} - D (n) - F
= n {m(n) + p(l+p)(9-9
]
.)V } - D
]
.(n) - F (17)
where n is the number of customers, 9_ is the risk aversion measure of
the asset transforming bank, and D (n) is its variable cost.
Let v = p(l+p)(9-9 )V and D (n) = D (n) + k(n); where k represents
1 LB
extra costs incurred in the process of asset transformation such as
the FDIC insurance premium (assuming k(0) =0, k' > and k" >_ 0).
U can be expressed as
U_(n) = U (n) + nv - k(n). (18)
L B
The last two terms in equation (18), the net benefit of asset trans-
formation over brokerage, yield the cost conditions which justify
asset transformation. Let n and n as the optimal numbers of custo-
mers of the asset transforming bank and the broker bank, respectively.
There are four conditions to be considered.
First, if n_v - k(n T ) < 0, it follows that U_(n T ) < U (n_) <II I I B I
Un^no)* *n this situation, the bank would stay as a broker if inves-B o
tors trust its information. In other words, when investors do not
-16-
trust the bank, asset transformation is a suboptimal choice of the
bank due to a credibility constraint. This result is consistent with
Diamond's finding that portfolio diversification reduces the incentive
costs of banks.
Second, if nT v - k(n ) > 0, it follows that U (n ) > U (n ). In11 115 1
this situation, the bank might have a motivation to be engaged in
asset transformation (though not a sufficient condition yet). For
this inequality to hold, 9 must not be smaller than 9
T
» Hence, a
necessary condition for asset transformation is that the bank is less
risk averse than investors.
Third, if nv - k(n ) > 0, it follows that U (n ) > U (n ) >
U (n ); that is, asset transformation becomes a first best choice of
8 B
the bank.
Fourth, if nv - k(n ) > and v > k'(n ), it follows that n >
n • Social welfare in the presence of the asset transforming bank is
B
definitely larger than that in the presence of the broker bank; i.e.,
the most efficient form of banking, in terms of social welfare, would
be asset transformation. For the proof, since !L(n ) > U (n ), we
need to show that il. > rv (i.e., managers' NPV further increases) if
v > k'(n_). The first derivative of equation (18) yields
°I
(n
i )
= U
B
(n
i
) + V " k ' (nl ) ~ °"
(L9)
For n_ > n , U'(n_) < which is held if v - k'(n_) > 0.
I B B I 1
Finally, the additional comparative static results on n^ would be
that 3n /8(9-9 ) > and 3n /3V > 0; as investors become relatively
-17-
more risk averse or the investment project becomes riskier, the asset
transformation function of the bank increases.
19
D. Competitive Banks: Brokerage
Suppose that there are x identical banks, and each handles n
customers. Therefore, the total number of investors served by com-
petitive banks is xn~ * n. Let m be the brokerage service fee of
banks. The profit of a bank, U , is
u
c
= Vc "W ' F< C20)
We assume that competitive banks earn zero profit. In Figures
IV-a and IV-b, we draw competitive individual and market equilibria,
respectively. In Figure IV-b, EMC represents the horizontal sum of
individual marginal cost curves. The service fee and the total number
of investors served by competitive banks are determined at the inter-
section of the m(n) and EMC curves. With the presence of competitive
banks, more investors purchase the high quality project at a lower
information fee, and, as a result, the NPV of managers increases.
Although social welfare is obviously higher with competitive banks
than without banks, the welfare comparison between competitive banks
and a monopolistic bank is not clear because total spending on infor-
mation acquisition (xF) may be too excessive.
III. SUMMARY
This paper examines the evolutionary process of banks as asset
transformers in a mixed quality capital market equilibrium under
asymmetric information. For the bank to be an information producer,
-18-
it must have a cost advantage in acquiring information relative to
investors. If the bank is not trusted, it might engage in asset
transformation, a second best choice. If the bank is less risk averse
than investors, asset transformation could be a first best choice of
the bank and potentially be the most efficient form of banking in
terms of social welfare.
-19-
FOOTNOTES
For literature survey, see Baltensperger (1980) and Santomero
(1984), among others.
2
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) suggest that coalition of banks
reduces their incentive costs. However, Boyd and Prescott (1983)
argue that the dishonesty issue might be overemphasized because crimi-
nal charges make the cost of such dishonesty extremely risky.
3
Though risk aversion of managers is an important factor in deter-
mining optimal contracts in the principal-agent relation (see, for
example, Shavell (1979)), the primary concern of our model is to show
how the lemons market can be avoided in the presence of asymmetric
information. The existence of the mixed quality equilibrium, from
which the banks start evolving, is invariant with respect to risk
aversion or neutrality of managers and/or investors.
4
We exclude the uninteresting possibility of managers' self -owning
projects.
This assumption is required to avoid the moral hazard problem of
managers who may attempt to fool investors by a false report.
Note that y is not less than 1/2 so that the higher (lower)
realized return is more closely related to the higher (lower) devel-
opment cost. That is, E(R|CH ) > E(R|CL ) if and only if y > 1/2.
See DeGroot (1970) for the sufficiency theorem.
Q
This type of utility function is very convenient when one is pri-
marily concerned with the quality choice (see, for example, Wiggins
and Lane (1983)).
9
We assume that the cost of locating a manager is entirely borne
by investors. Because each manager offers one unit of the project, if
more than one investors visit a manager, the investors except one
should visit other managers. Given potentially many investors, as the
number of managers increases, so does the average number of "costly"
visits an investor has to make before being able to buy one project.
Under the equilibrium wage contract described above that yields zero
reservation expected utility in each period (i.e., once the equi-
librium is reached at t 0), no investor will visit another manager
at t 3 1. Therefore, the transaction cost incurs only at t 0.
Also, note that this transaction cost should be distinguished from the
acquisition cost for perfect information which will be discussed in
the next section.
See Dokko and Kim (1987) for the cases where z = and z 1 and
the details of the mixed quality equilibrium.
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Some properties of (r+s-1), which are useful in our later analysis,
are as follows: (i) (r+s-1) = { (2y-l)z(l-z ) }/ {v(l-v) }; (ii) (r+s-1) >
iff y > 1/2; (iii) given y, 3(r+s-l)/3z •? iff z - 1/2; (iv) the
maximum of (r+s-1) is 2y-l when z = 1/2; (v) given z, 3(r+s-l)/3y > 0;
and (vi) (r+s-1) is symmetric around z » 1/2.
12
N does not appear in the equilibrium condition, equation (11).
13
m = p(l+p){E(R|CH ) - 9V} - W - p{yWH + (l-yWj
2
= (l-z)pAE(R) + p {(l-y)y + s(l-y)}AE(R) + h(N-n).
From equations (5) and (6), (l-r)y + s(l-r) = (y(l-y)(l-z )/(v( 1-v)) }
- (l-z)([y(l-y)/(v(l-v)] -1+1}. From equation (11),
P
2 {[y(l-y)/(v(l-v)] - 1}AE(R) = -AC.
14
From the mixed quality equilibrium condition, equation (11),
p(2y-l)AE(R) 2 (AC/p)/(2y-l) because (r+s-1) _< (2y-l). Therefore,
2 2 2
p AE(R) > p (2y-l) AE(R) > AC for y < 1. Therefore, m is always
positive.
15 3m/3y = -(3z/3y ) [p(l+p)AE(R)-AC ] + 2(l-z)(l+p) AR. A tedius
calculation yields (3z/3y )(2y-l ) > 4(l-z), which leads to the desired
result, 3m/3y < 0.
Social welfare is defined as the sum of total NPV's and consumer
surpluses. When banks are introduced below (Section II), social
welfare includes net profits (risk adjusted) of banks.
With perfect prior information, the gain from the high quality
project is greater than that from the low quality project. Hence, the
bank confirms high quality projects only.
We assume that the ability of the bank to issue risk-free bonds
is exogenously given by FDIC deposit insurance.
19
We consider only the case of competitive broker banks. The case
of asset transforming banks can be similarly analyzed.
-21-
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